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IN THE SUPREME COURT
o~F THE STATE 0'F UTAH
FLORA M. ROBISON,
Plaintiff and Respondent,

-vs.-

PETE WILLDEN, a minor, by and
through his guardian Ad Litem,
MARVELL WILLDEN, and
MARVELL WILLDEN,
Defendants and .Ap,pella;nts.

Case
No. 8597

Respondent's Brief
STATEMENT OF FACTS
In his brief, the defendant has made a fragmentary
statement of facts, which we do not consider sufficient.
However, in the discussion which follows, we have marshalled the pertinent facts in the nature of supplement
to appellant's statement; and to avoid unnecessary repetition, these facts are not set out under this heading.
Throughout this brief, the appellant is referred to as
the defendant and the respondent as the plaintiff.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THERE IS SUFFICIE-NT EVIDENCE TO SUPPORT
THE FINDINGS AND JUDGMENT OF THE TRIAL
COURT.

Both points argued in appellant's brief are based
upon an alleged insufficiency of the evidence to support
the findings and judgment of the trial court. The appellant does not question the findings of the court with
respect to the injuries which plaintiff received or the
causal connection of those injuries with the collision
which occurred; neither does he claim contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff. He simply asserts
that, as a matter of law, the defendant was not negligent;
and that the defendant's negligence did not cause the
collision to occur. The evidence which refutes defendant's contentions is hereinafter summarized.
The plaintiff testified as follows :
''A. I looked south and saw a car coming
about three hundred feet away right in front of
the Oakwood Apartments, and I saw that I hadordinarily I had plenty of time to make the turn
because I have driven in and out there for thirtysix years, and so I made the turn, but he was
coming at such a rate of speed that he caught me
before I got in the aYenue.

"Q. No\Y, you say that he appeared to be
in front of the Oak\vood Apartments \Yhen you
sa\v him as you \Yere making your turn~
'' 1\.. l.,.. es. If anything, farther south, because

he "Tas-\:vell, that's right on the corner, but it
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wouldn't be quite to Sixth South on account of
the curbing.

'' Q. To what extent did you slow before you
made your turn~
''A. I think I stopped. If I didn't stop suddenly, I slowed up mighty slow before I would
make the turn.

'' Q. Did you make a signal for the

turn~

''A. Yes.

'' Q. How did you make the signal for the
turn~

''A. Well, my light signals are good, and
that's the way I make it.

'' Q. Do you have a lever on the steering post
of your automobile that you operate a turn signal
with~

"A. Yes.

'' Q. And did you pull this lever to signal a
left turn before you started to make the turn~
"A. Yes." (R. 10-11)
The plaintiff was in the lane nearest to the center of
the highway when he commenced to make his turn, and
before he started the turn he saw the defendant coming
at that time. The defendant was 300 feet south and
there were no other cars bet,veen the defendant's car
and the plaintiff's. The defendant's car ''ras in the lane
of traffic nearest the cur b. There were two lanes of traffic
on 5th East Street on each side of the center line, besides
the parking area. The impact was in the outside lane of
traffic next to the parking lane. (R. 18-19)
3
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On cross-examination, George F. Robison, the driver
of the car in which plaintiff was · riding, testified as
follows:
''A. I could observe the traffic, yes, I saw
him coming down there but didn't know he was
traveling at such a rate of speed.

"Q. All right. Now, then, when you started
your left turn, that was when he was at three hundred feet away~
"A. Yes." (R. 22)
In describing the traffic situation prior to the impact,
Mr. Robison stated that there were a number of cars
going south at the time on 5th East, but the only car
approaching from the north was the defendant's car. It
was still daylight. (R. 27)
William Adelbert Robison was a witness called by
the plaintiff, who resides at 635 South 5th East. He was
not related to the plaintiff. He first noticed the Robison
car pull up behind him when he was stopped for the red
light on 5th South on 5th East. (R. 40) As the witness
proceeded south, the Robison car remained behind him
in the same lane of traffic. He remembers looking through
his rear-vie"r mirror and seeing the Robison car commence the turn. The 'Yitness sa"T the defendant's car,
vvhich passed hin1 about half-,yay from the Ha"Tthorne
Court intersection to 6th South. He did not anticipate
there 'vas going to he a collision at the time the defendnnt 's car passed him. The defendant's car appeared to
he going heyond the speed limit. (R,. 42) He did not see
the collision oecur, but he heard the noise 'vhen the cars
4
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hit. (R. 43) The witness did not observe any other cars
proceeding northerly, except the defendant's car. (R. 46)
This witness was traveling about 25 miles per hour, and
he had reached a point about half the distance between
6th South and the Hawthorne Court intersection before
the defendant's car, approaching from the opposite direction, passed him. (R. 47)
Glen S. Cahoon, the police officer who investigated
the accident after it had occurred, testified that the defendant's vehicle traveled 126 feet from the point of
impact before it came to rest; that the Robison vehicle
was damaged in the front door, rear door and fender,
quite extensively in the rear door. The Robison car was
resting against a third car which had been parked along
the side of the road facing north. (R. 52) There were
no brake marks on the highway at all. Upon applying the brakes on the defendant's vehicle, there were
none. There was no liquid on the highway to indicate
that the brakes had lost their fluid at the scene of
impact. (R. 53) Several officers tried the brakes in the
presence of the defendant to indicate to him there
weren't any. (R. 54) The defendant's vehicle was damaged quite extensively on the right front. (R. 56) The
defendant admitted that he was exceeding the 30 m.p.h.
speed limit in driving between 30 and 35 miles per hour
and estimated his speed at the time of impact to be 35
miles per hour, according to the statement made by the
defendant to Officer Young. (R. 75) He first noticed danger of an accident when he was 10 feet away. He told the
officer that he was going north and was looking at a

5
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parked car and the other car turned in front of him and
he couldn't stop in time. (R. 76) The defendant testified
as follo,vs :

'' Q. What was the first thing you saw of Mr.
Robison's car1

''A. I just saw-I saw him whip in a flash of
white paint as my headlights went across his
paint, and I hit him.

Q. You say white

paint~

"A. It was light paint. I had my lights on
and seen the glare of the lights on the shine of the
car, and I hit him.
'' Q. Had you seen his car before he made the
turn~

"A. No, I hadn't."
The defendant admitted that his brakes did not
function properly. (R. 97) On cross examination the
defendant stated that he was about 30 feet away when
he first saw the Robison car. (R. 103)
Certainly this is evidence sufficient to sustain a findinfi of failure to maintain a proper lookout, especially
\vhen vie\Yed in light of the evidence that the Robison
car gnve a light signal and c.ommenred its turn \vhen
the defendnnt \vas still 300 feet a\Yay. If the defendant
had been maintaining a reasonable lookout he would have
hoco1ne a\Ynre of Robison's intention to turn and of his
net of tnrnin~ in ~ufficient time to permit him (the del'eudant) to altl)l' his course or decrease the speed of his
vehiele.
6
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We will proceed to a discussion of the cases cited
by the- defendant in his brief. On page 24, the defendant
invites this court's examination of the case of Hickock
vs. Skinner, 113 Ut. 1, 190 P. 2d 514, and this seems rather
strange to us in view of the fact that he also cites the
more recent case of Martin vs. Stevens, 121 Ut. 484, 243
P. 2d 747, in which this court expressly overruled the case
of H ickock vs. Skinner. At any rate, this court said at
page 751 in the Martin vs. Stevens case:
"If as stated by Mr. Chief Justice Wolfe in
his concurring opinion, the facts of H ickock vs.
Skinner, supra, do not bring it within the principle
above stated, it was wrongly decided and is
here by overruled.''
In the case of Martin vs. Stevens, the question of
contributory negligence was before the court, and as the
plaintiff approached the intersection of Stratford Avenue
and 18th East Street he first saw the defendant's car
when it "\vas about 60 feet from the intersection. In the
case at bar, the distance separating the two cars was 300
feet, when Mr. Robison commenced to enter the intersection and make his turn. Yet in the Stevens' case, the
court held, and rightly so, that the question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence was for the jury and could
not be determined as a matter of law. We do not perceive how the Mart in vs. Steven-s case can provide any
comfort and encouragement to the defendant in the case
at bar.
In the case of Lou,der vs. Halley, 120 U t. 231, 233 P.
2d 350, cited with approval in the 1J1artin vs. Stevens case,
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supra, it was held that the driver .of a vehicle which had
entered the intersection when the defendant's car was
250 feet away could reasonably assume that the defendant would yield him the right of way. Although the question of contributory negligence is not herein involved, we
think the principle in the Matrin vs. Stevens and Lowder
vs. Halley case, supra, would support a finding that the
defendant in the case at bar failed to yield the right of
way and failed to maintain a reasonable lookout.
The defendant has cited the case of Cederloff vs.
lVhited, 110 Ut. 45, 169 P 2d 778, to support his claim
that the failure to keep a proper lookout on his part
could not have been one of the proximate causes of the
accident. There are many distinguishing factors bet,veen that decision which was written by Mr. Justice
Wade and the case at bar. In the Cederloff case, the
situation was reversed. The defendant attempted to turn
into the path of plaintiff's car. The driver of the turning
vehicle did not see the other car prior to impact, which
would compel a finding that the driver of the turning
vehicle was negligent as a matter of law. In the case
there was undisputed testimony to the effect that the
plaintiff's car was traveling between 25 and 30 miles per
hour, and there 'vas no evidence that the turning car ever
acquired a right of way. In the Cederloff case, there was
no intersection involved. In the case at bar, the driver
of the Robison's Yehicle signaled for the left turn at an
intersection, sa"· the defendant approaching from the
opposite direction at a distance of 300 feet, which would
have permitted Robison ample time to complete his turn,
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if the defendant had been traveling at a lawful rate of
speed. If the defendant in the case at bar had been
maintaining a proper lookout, he would have perceived
that plaintiff was intending to turn and in the act of
turning; and the defendant was sufficiently far away to
permit him to adjust to the situation by reducing his
speed or turning to avoid the collision. Coupled with
the defendant's inattention were his totally ineffective
brakes and his excessive rate of speed. Indeed, there
was no evidence of any brake marks at all on the highway. According to the driver of the Robison vehicle,
the impact occurred near the east line of 5th East Street,
and the damage to the Robison car indicated that the
greater force of the impact was toward the rear. There
was no evidence that the defendant swerved his vehicle
at all prior to impact, although he had another lane of
traffic on his side of the road in which to turn. Under all
these circumstances, which differed from the Cederloff
case, we believe the trial court was justified in finding
that the Robison vehicle had acquired the right of way
and the failure of the defendant to yield that right of
way and to maintain a proper lookout was a proximate
cause of the collision.
The case of French vs. Utah Oil Refining Co., 117 Ut.
406, 216 P. 2d 1002, also cited by the defendant, is distinguishable from the case at bar. In that case the truck was
traveling between 20 and 25 miles per hour and was
from 100 to 120 feet away when first noticed by the car
which attempted to turn to the left. The eourt held that
the turn was negligent as a matter of law, and the other
9
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vehicle was so close as to constitute an immediate hazard.
The court did not pass upon the negligence of the defendant in that case and affirmed a nonsuit awarded by the
trial court against the plaintiff. The question of contributory negligence, as heretofore pointed out in this
brief, is not involved in this case.
In the case of Richards vs. Palace Laundry, 55 Utah
409, 186 P. 439, relied upon by the defendant, the right
of recovery in that case was entirely based upon the
last clear chance doctrine, and there was no evidence
whatsoever that the defendant saw the plaintiff fall on
the street on defendant's side of the road in time to permit the defendant to avoid hitting him. In that case there
was no intersection involved, and the plaintiff fell from
his bicycle into the path of the defendant's truck when
the truck was not more than 25 or 35 feet away. We do
not disagree with the principles of law asserted by the
case of Richards vs. Palace Laundry, supra, but the facts
of the case are not at all comparable to the facts in the
case at bar.
In his brief the defendant engaged in some mathematical gymnastics based upon premises not supported
by all the evidence, and upon fragments of evidence considered out of context, 'vhich, "~e belieYe, do not provide assistance to this court in deciding this case. The
burden is on the defendant in this case to show the absence of evidence that reasonably supports the findings
of the trial court. The defendant does not sustain this
burden by selecting fragments of eYidence more favorable to him and making mathematical calculations based
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thereon. In this case, the defendant cannot escape from
the evidence that he was 300 feet away when the driver
of the Robison vehicle commenced its turn across the
center line of the highway. The defendant was looking at
a parked car and did not see the Robison vehicle until,
to use his language: ''I just saw-I saw him .whip in a
flash of white paint as my headlights (which were not
burning) went across his path and I hit him.'' He did not
see the Robison car at all until he made the turn. (R. 76)

CONCLUSION
From the foregoing discussion, we earnestly contend that therH was ample evidence to support the findings of the trial court that the defendant was negligent in
failing to maintain a proper lookout and in failing to
yield the right of way to the vehicle in which plaintiff was
riding as a guest passenger and that the judgment of
the trial court should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,

WOODROW D. WHITE
Attorney for Plaintiff
and Respondent
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